Responsibility: are we really responsible for our actions? Essay

Have you ever wondered if the stopping point that you allow just run was the lift out possible ratiocination for you to make? An cistrons relationship between duty and his lasts in intent be affected by the alternative choices that were non taken as well as the choices that were make. doubting Thomas Nagel believes that an constituents autonomy is always being threatened by the possibility of a bandstand that is more bearing than his own. His ensure on state is such that in order to place state on an agent, sufficient watching about alternative choices must be considered. On the other hand, Carl Ginet claims that guiltless will skunknot be caused ( unaffectionate will is not determined), but rather that the will is free.He claims that responsibility is a result of the agents inherent free will to choose and is instance specific. Ginet feels that since we are free beings, we are responsible for every decision that we make, but not for the causes of our choices. T his is contrary to Nagels stance of responsibility. He asserts that in order for an agent to be held responsible for his decisions, the agent must have sufficient noesis of some(prenominal) unobjective and objective viewpoints. Nagel believes that this requires a highly developed view of the self and is very unenviable to achieve.Responsibilityfor our locomoteions seems to only stem from the choices that we make, but the decisions that we do not make also affect our point in time of responsibility.Ginet feels that the only two propositions regarding free will are either that the will is caused or that the will is free. He argues that if the will is caused no agent can be held responsible for his decisions. One of Ginets arguments is that if the will is to be caused and a choice is presented to an agent that no one can be intelligibly described as knowing what his decision will be before he makes it because the claim to possess such acquaintance is implicitly inconsistent, (G inet 50). He claims that since agents cannot know what decision they are going to make before they make them, that the agents decisions are not caused. There is no point in deciding to take a course of action that is already known to the agent. A decision, in this case, would be useless because an agent cannot learn onan action if the agent already knows what he will do.As Ginet points out, if the agent does already know what he will decide to do, then he cannot by the process of making up his mind express himself to anything that he does not already know, (Ginet 52). If this is the case than an agent cannot be held responsible for his decisions because he could not perhaps persuade himself to take a new course of action. On the other hand, if the will is to be free, placing responsibility for the decisions of an agent is valid. Ginet believes that with free will, a decision should be self-determining, ?a decision is a specific event which, like a flash or bang, can be identified independently of inquiry into its causes, (Ginet 54). A decisionis to be judged simply as an event and not by the events that caused it. If the will is free, responsibility can be placed on an agent, speckle if the will is caused, responsibility is discounted.Autonomy and the tradeoff between the subjective and objective points of view are at the heart of an agents decision making, according to Nagel. He contends that there are levels of autonomy but no one can reach the highest level (perfect autonomy). high levels of autonomy are reached through self-actualization and reflection on oneself. An agents autonomy stems from the objective reflection of his viewpoint. However, Nagel believes that an agent can loose his autonomy and ultimately his free will by being as well reflective as is shown in this quote, ?so the problem of free will lies in the erosion of interpersonal attitudes and of the sense of autonomy, (Nagel 112).Nagels problem with free will, in making decisions, comes from the desire to possess both the objective (observer) perspective and the subjective (actor) perspective at the same instant. The problem here, is that an agent cannot be both do the action and, at the same moment, be a passive observer. Why would we want to have both a subjective and an objective viewpoint at the same instant? To possess both would pixilated that the agent has the knowledge of the external perspectives affecting the decisions as well as the internal desires and the ability to act on them. Because an agent views his choice subjectively, there may be alternative choices thatare not made conscious(predicate) to the agent and that may eventually prove to be the high hat course ofaction. An example of this special(prenominal) case is as follows a bank bank clerk (who is relatively new to his position) is held up at stop and ordered to give the robber the banks money.This bank teller mentally reviews his military position and finds that the shell course of act ion is to hand over the money coolly. While this is happening, the bank manager is also reviewing the situation and has decided that if he were in the tellers situation that he would push the hidden liberation underneath the desk. This button would release a plate of bulletproof glass between the robber and the teller. Unfortunately, the teller is new to his position and does not have this objective knowledge. The question before us is the teller responsible for the loss of the banks money? This question will be considered later. Subjective and objective viewpoints oftentimes coincide with autonomy and self-reflection.It is the choices from which we have to choose from, in any circumstance situation, that determine the degree of responsibility to which we attribute our actions. In order to answer the question stated in the antedate paragraph about the bank teller, one must choose to go along with Nagels or Ginets view on responsibility. If one holds to Ginets conviction that th e will is free, then we are responsible for our decisions. However, judgment of the particular decision is limited to the decision being only a specific event and not of the preceding events. Judgment and responsibility in this case do not have anything to do with preceding causes in any way or the decisions that could have been made if the agent had a more objective viewpoint. In the case of the bank teller, his decision in giving therobber the money and thereby choosing the safest and most peaceful solution was, indeed, the best decision he could have made.He is not heldaccountable for the lost money. When Nagels outlook on responsibility is applied to assess this situation, we see that there was a better decision that could have been made. If the teller had the objective knowledge about the button under the desk that the manager had, he could have prevented the robber from stealing the banks money. However, if he only had this objectivity and not his subjectivity, he would not be in the position to produce the volition at all. The teller did not, in this case, choose the best decision, but at the same time is not fully responsible for the loss of the banks money.The teller is partly held accountable for the lost money because there was an alternative choice that would have made the overall outcome better off. Unfortunately for the teller, the knowledge of the hidden button was not made aware to him. This is why the teller is only partly responsible. Ginet asserts that responsibility is to be judged by the specific event while Nagel implies that there are different degrees of responsibility that vary with the amount of information that the agent has.Judgment on a decision can be assessed using Ginets event specific outlook on responsibility or Nagels view that there are varying degrees of responsibility. Both of these methods rely on the agents knowledge of the particular situation to make the best decision, but only Nagels method of judging a decision incor porates objective knowledge that the agent may be part (or notat all) unaware of. Ginets stance on responsibility is that only the specific decision can be judged because the causes that led up to the decision are irrelevant when an agent finally comes to a conclusion when making a particular decision.Nagel states that in order to make the best decision possible, an agent must have both subjective and objective knowledge. In this case, responsibility is not only derived from the decision that is actually made, but is also derived from decisions that could have been made (even if the agent did not have enough knowledge to consider all his possibilities). Both methods of assessing responsibility are valid, but Nagels method may be considered unfair. The agent is beingheld accountable for something that is out of his control (he does not have adequate knowledge). When we are faced with a decision, we must consider all that is before us in order to make the best possible choice. We wil l be held responsible for the decisions we make and for the decisions we did not make.Works CitedGinet, Carl. Can the result be Caused? Philosophical Review 71 (1962) 49-55.Reprinted in New Readings in Philosophical Analysis, ed. H. Feigl, W. Sellarsand K. Lehrer (New York Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1972).Nagel, Thomas. The View from Nowhere. Cambridge University Press. (1979).pp.110-137